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Abstract
Designing and implementing efficient firewall strategies in the age of the In-
ternet of Things (IoT) is far from trivial. This is because, as time proceeds, an
increasing number of devices will be connected, accessed and controlled on
the Internet. Additionally, an ever-increasingly amount of sensitive informa-
tion will be stored on various networks. A good and efficient firewall strategy
will attempt to secure this information, and to also manage the large amount
of inevitable network traffic that these devices create. The goal of this paper is
to propose a framework for designing optimized firewalls for the IoT.
This paper deals with two fundamental challenges/problems encountered
in such firewalls. The first problem is associated with the so-called “Rule
Matching” (RM) time problem. In this regard, we propose a simple condition
for performing the swapping of the firewall’s rules, and by satisfying this con-
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dition, we can guarantee that apart from preserving the firewall’s consistency
and integrity, we can also ensure a greedy reduction in the matching time. It
turns out that though our proposed novel solution is relatively simple, it can be
perceived to be a generalization of the algorithm proposed by Fulp [1]. How-
ever, as opposed to Fulp’s solution, our swapping condition considers rules
that are not necessarily consecutive. It rather invokes a novel concept that we
refer to as the “swapping window”.
The second contribution of our paper is a novel “batch”-based traffic es-
timator that provides network statistics to the firewall placement optimizer.
The traffic estimator is a subtle but modified batch-based embodiment of the
Stochastic LearningWeak Estimator (SLWE) proposed by Oommen and Rueda
[2].
The paper contains the formal properties of this estimator. Further, by per-
forming a rigorous suite of experiments, we demonstrate that both algorithms
are capable of optimizing the constraints imposed for obtaining an efficient
firewall.
Keywords: Firewall Optimization, Matching time, Weak Estimators, Learning
Automata, Non-Stationary Environments, Batch Update.
1. Introduction
The inter-connectivity, convenience and the all-prevalent digital services
offered by the Internet, come with a steep price. As our society becomes more
dependent on the Internet, the requirement to secure the information stored
on these devices and services is more stringent and demanding. To secure
the information, the users and systems’ administrators have to be even more
security-conscious.
The filed of computer security is extensive. It encompasses the security of
the physical machines as well as the information stored on them. However, in
the context of the Internet, one has to be additionally concerned with network-
related aspects of security. Such a “specialized” form of security is mandatory
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especially because an increasing number of devices are connected to various
networks, and primarily to the Internet [3]. Network security deals with the se-
curity aspects of data and communication within a/multiple network(s), and it
spansmany different concepts such as authentication, access policies, intrusion
detection, intrusion prevention and honeypots/honeynets.
A first line of defence in network security is to use a firewall in order to
enforce access policies. A firewall, in essence, is a system architecture program
whose objective is to filter the incoming and outgoing packet traffic on a host
or in a network. The task of accepting or denying access to the network is
enforced by matching the header information of each data packet against a
predefined set of rules, referred to as the “firewall policy”. Each rule has an
action associated with it, for example, to either deny or accept access, and this
action is what decides whether a packet is dropped or not.
A study of many Internet and private traces shows that the major portion
of any network’s traffic matches only a small subset of firewall rules. This, in
turn, implies that the frequency distribution for some of the traffic properties
appears to be highly skewed [4]. Furthermore, when performing packet filter-
ing, each rule in a firewall policy will usually be checked in a sequential order.
Consequently, as the firewall policy increases in size, as any rule is often com-
bined with a matching rule of a higher order, the overhead associated with the
task of filtering the firewall, will become increasingly costly.
The reader will easily see that this rule matching phase can easily become a
bottleneck in a high speed network when it is under attack or when it encoun-
ters a heavy network load [1, 5]. Furthermore, it is well known that the com-
puting power of hosts, the transmission speeds of packets and the complexity
of networks, continue to increase. To keep abreast with these increasingly-
demanding environments, firewalls must be able to “proportionately” adapt
to changes by processing packets at increasingly higher speeds [6, 7]. Thus,
it is desirable that a firewall monitoring system processes a lesser number of
packet matches in order to reduce the potentially exorbitant filtering overhead
as well as the overall packet matching time [4].
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A natural inference of the above assertions is the following: In order reduce
the number of packet matches that have to be processed, and to ensure that
a firewall is able to process packets at an adequate speed, it is crucial for the
firewall’s architecture to have an optimized ordering for the appropriate rules.
This can be achieved by ensuring that the rule ordering is such that the rules
that are matched most often, appear at the top (front) of the list of rules. This
will reduce the amount of time used to process a packet by reducing the num-
ber of required packet matches, and consequently reducing the packet filtering
overhead. Additionally, it will also have the effect of improving the network’s
throughput because a packet will spend less time being processed.
Although the problem is easily stated, the task of finding the optimal rule
order is NP-hard because of inter-rule dependencies. Our goal is thus to find a
heuristic algorithm to find a near-optimal rule order.
The complexity of the problem is accentuated by the fact that traffic patterns
in networks are not static. This implies that since the patterns are dynamic
and possibly time varying, one cannot learn the statistics of the traffic patterns
using traditional estimation methods. Rather, one has to devise estimation (or
learning) strategies that are rather effective for non-stationary environments.
This is the task we undertake!
1.1. Problem Statement and Contributions
Put in a nutshell, this paper deals with dynamic networks, i.e., those that are
characterized by being “under constant change and activity”. Essentially, a
dynamic network is one in which the state of packet traffic is time-varying and
non-stationary. This implies that the packet traffic fluctuates in such a way that
no single type of traffic is dominant for an extended period of time. Our goal
is to find a solution to the problem of optimizing the performance of a firewall
in such dynamic networks. In order to achieve this, we attempt to answer the
following questions:
• How can we optimize the order of the firewall rules in order to minimize the Rule
Matching (RM) operations invoked?
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• How can we learn and use the dynamic network traffic statistics to further opti-
mize the firewall?
Of course, to achieve the above, we shall examine the traffic patterns statis-
tically, combine the inferences with the workings of a RM algorithm. Thus, the
major contributions of this paper are:
• We present an efficient and yet simple mechanism for optimizing the or-
der of the rules in the firewall by using a novel concept that is referred
to as the Swapping Window. The Swapping Window is a straightfor-
ward strategy by which one can infer whether it is beneficial to swap
the order of two rules in a RM algorithm by considering their matching
probabilities, and simultaneously guaranteeing that no inconsistencies
are introduced in the firewall. We submit that, without loss of general-
ity, our solution is a mapped efficient solution to the Single Machine Job
Scheduling (SMJS) Problem [8] – since our problem can be shown to be a
specific instantiation of the latter.
• We present a novel adaptive algorithm for estimating the statistics of
multinomial observations appearing in a batch mode4. The algorithm
is able to deal with non-stationary environments and is an extension of
the Stochastic Learning Weak Estimation (SLWE) work by Oommen and
Rueda [2], which is, in and of itself, suitably adapted for high speed net-
works. The observations that the estimation scheme receives are, in our
case, the different matched rules within a time interval when they are
examined as a “batched” data stream and not as sequential entities.
• We combine both the above-mentioned contributions (the rule ordering
algorithm augmented with the estimation scheme) into a single algo-
rithm so as to achieve a holistic approach for optimizing the firewall’s
performance.
4The batched-mode version of Oommen-Rueda’s SLWE is a contribution in its own right to the
field of estimation in non-stationary environments.
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1.2. Organization of the Paper
After having introduced and motivated the problem in Section 1, we pro-
ceed to review the related state-of-the-art in Section 2. In this section, we in-
troduce the fundamental concepts and notations required for this paper to be
a self-contained document. As well, in this section, as we will review the rele-
vant relatedwork. In Section 3, we present our solution composed of two main
components: Rule Re-ordering (RR) and traffic estimation.
In Section 4, we present some theoretical results that demonstrate the va-
lidity of the algorithms proposed in Section 3 for both rule ordering and esti-
mation. Section 5 contains simulation results demonstrating the power of the
scheme in stationary and dynamic environments. The experiments done for
dynamic environments were based on a realistic test-bed, while those done for
stationary environments were done using a simulated set-up (without requir-
ing a test-bed). The paper also includes a thorough discussion of the results.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. State-of-the-Art
This section outlines the current state-of-the-art when it concerns firewall
optimization. It also introduces and explains several key concepts, technolo-
gies and applications that we will use in this paper.
2.1. Firewalls
Based on the article Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall Performance (RFC
2647) in [9], a firewall is defined as “a device or group of devices that enforces
an access control policy between networks”. Firewalls are thus, devices or pro-
grams that control the flow of network traffic between networks or hosts [10].
2.1.1. Rules and Packets
To understand how a firewall operates, it is necessary to understand the
relationship between the access control rules and the packets that they govern.
We now present a formal explanation of the relevant terms.
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A firewall rule, r, is defined as an n-tuple of ordered fields:
r = (r[1], . . . ,r[n]), for n > 1.
Although the upper bound of n is network specific, for an Internet firewall,
it is usually set to five and comprises of the following fields: Protocol, Source
Address, Source Port, Destination Address, and Destination Port [4, 11, 12].
Each rule has an action field associated with it, and the value of the field de-
cides the actions that the firewall will take when a match is found. Table 1
outlines the values of the action fields.
Action Effect
Accept Forward the packet
Deny Drop the packet
Log, Accept Log and forward the packet
Log, Deny Log and drop the packet
Table 1: The action field values of a firewall and its effects.
The Protocol field specifies a protocol as documented in the IP packet header’s
protocol field, as stated in Internet Protocol (RFC 791). For an Internet firewall,
this would be either TCP, UDP or ICMP. However, it could also contain a wild
card value (*), in which case it will match any protocol [10, 11, 13, 14]. The
Address and Port fields specify the source and destination IP addresses, and
the source and destination port numbers of incoming and outgoing packets.
Both of these fields can be configured to represent a range of values or a set of
values, rather than only a single value. Tables 2 and 3 outline these types of
configurations for the port and address fields respectively.
Notation Example Explanation
Wild Card * or any Port range 0 - 65535
Range 90-94 The given range of port numbers
Single 90 A single given port number
Table 2: Notation for the port field in a firewall rule.
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Notation Example Explanation
CIDR 192.0.2.0/24 Address range 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
Wild Card 192.0.* Address range 192.0.0.0 - 192.0.255.255
Range 192.0.2.2 - 192.0.2.150 The given range of addresses
Single 192.0.2.2 A single given IP address
Table 3: Notation for the address field in a firewall rule.
A data packet, p, is defined as an n-tuple of ordered parameters:
p = (p[1], . . . , p[n]), for n > 1.
The upper bound of n is limited by the fields defined in the Internet Protocol
(RFC 791) [13]. That being said, not all fields in the IP header are of importance
for a firewall. Thus, a data packet, as seen by a firewall, is comprised mainly of
the following fields [4, 11, 12]:
1. Protocol
2. Source Address IP
3. Source PORT
4. Destination Address IP
5. Destination PORT
These fields correspond to the fields that a firewall rule is comprised of and
that it processes.
2.1.2. Firewall Policies
A firewall security policy defines how an organization’s firewall handles
inbound and outbound network traffic based on its security policies. Prior to
establishing these security policies, generally speaking [10], an organization
should conduct a rigorous risk analysis in order to discover what types of traf-
fic passes through its networks at all times. Based on such an analysis, the
administrators should determine how they can secure it. Indeed, a firewall
security policy is the result of implementing such an analysis .
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Examples of policy requirements include accepting only necessary IP pro-
tocols to pass [13], authorized source and destination IP addresses, authorized
TCP and UDP ports to be used, and certain ICMP types and codes to be used
[10]. Generally speaking, all inbound and outbound traffic that is not expressly
permitted by the firewall policy should be blocked because such traffic is not
needed by the organization. This practice can also have the additional bene-
fit of reducing the risk of attacks and decreasing the volume of traffic carried
into/through the organization’s networks [10].
To specify a formal definition for a firewall policy, let:
R = {r1,r2,r3, . . . ,rN}, for N > 1
be the set of ordered firewall rules comprising a policy.
Such a firewall policy is considered to be comprehensive if any packet, p,
has a match in R. In practice, this is achieved by implementing a Default Rule
[4, 10] which serves the purpose of being a catch-all rule. It is usually added at
the end of a policy and is designed such that it will simply discard any packet
that has not matched any of the above rules. Table 4 shows an implementation
of one such comprehensive firewall security policy.
2.1.3. Packet Matching
In many implementations of firewalls, the rules are stored internally as
linked lists [12]. A firewall will, thus, generally speaking, sequentially compare
a packet with a rule. In order for a rule, ri, to match a packet, p, the parameters
of the packet header must be a subset of all the permitted corresponding fields
in the rule. Thus, if
ri[l], for l = 1 . . .n, and
p[l], for l = 1 . . .n
represent the ordered fields of the rule ri and the ordered parameters of the
packet header for packet p respectively, the match between rule ri and the
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Source Destination
No. Proto. IP PORT IP PORT Action Prob.
1 UDP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.05555555555
2 UDP 190.1.1.* * * 90-94 deny 0.05555555555
3 UDP 190.1.2.* * * * deny 0.05555555555
4 UDP 190.1.1.2 * * 94 accept 0.05555555555
5 TCP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.05555555555
6 TCP 190.1.1.* * * 88 deny 0.05555555555
7 TCP 190.1.1.2 * * 88-94 deny 0.05555555555
8 TCP 190.1.2.* * * * accept 0.05555555555
9 TCP * * 161.120.33.41 25 accept 0.05555555555
10 TCP 140.192.37.30 * * 21 deny 0.05555555555
11 TCP * * 161.120.33.* 21 deny 0.05555555555
12 TCP 140.192.37.* * * 21 accept 0.05555555555
13 TCP * * 161.120.33.* 22 accept 0.05555555555
14 TCP 140.192.37.* * * 80 deny 0.05555555555
15 TCP * * 161.120.33.40 80 accept 0.05555555555
16 TCP * * 161.120.33.43 53 accept 0.05555555555
17 UDP * * 161.120.33.43 53 accept 0.05555555555
18 * * * * * deny 0.05555555555
Table 4: An example of a firewall security policy configuration with equal initial probabilities.
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packet p can be denoted as:
p⇒ ri ⇐⇒ ∀ l, p[l]⊂ r[l], for l = 1 . . .n.
Informally speaking, p matches ri if and only if all the parameters of p are in
a subset of the respective fields of ri. Because each parameter p[li] must match
the corresponding field ri[l j], the order of fields in a rule is important to the rule
matching process. Thus, a packet p can match multiple rules in a firewall, R.
The matching policy of the firewall decides which rule render the packet to be
considered to be “matching”.
There are, generally, three commonmatching policies used, namely, the Best
Match, Last Match and First Match policies [15] listed below:
• BestMatch: A packet is compared against all ri ∈R. The rule thatmatches
the closest with the packet is selected and its action is consequently exe-
cuted.
• Last Match: A packet is sequentially compared to each rule ri ∈ R. The
last rule that matches, p⇒ ri ∈ R, is selected and its action is consequently
executed.
• First Match: A packet is sequentially compared to each rule ri ∈ R. The
First rule that matches, p ⇒ ri ∈ R, is selected and its action is conse-
quently executed.
The Best Match and potentially, the Last Match schemes increase the packet
matching time. Consequently, in this paper, we assume a First Matchmatching
policy.
2.2. Firewall Modelling and Policy Anomalies
This section outlines how a firewall is modeled and what policy anomalies
are.
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2.2.1. Rule Intersection
As stated in Section 2.1.1, any parameter of a rule can contain a range of
values. A consequence of this is that multiple rules can intersect. Two rules, ri
and r j, intersect if a comparison of their ordered parameters yields a nonempty
set. More formally, this is represented as below:
ri ∩ r j 6= /0 ⇐⇒ ∃l, ri[l]∩ r j[l] 6= /0, for l = 1 . . .n.
Consider Table 5 which displays some examples of this.
Source Destination
No. Proto. IP PORT IP PORT Action
1 UDP 190.1.* * * 90 accept
2 UDP 190.1.1.* * * 90-94 deny
3 TCP 140.192.37.30 * 161.120.33.40 80 deny
Table 5: Intersecting and non-intersecting rules.
Rules 1 and 2 intersect because Rule 2 describes a subnet in Rule 1. Fur-
ther, the port in Rule 1 is a subset of the ports in Rule 2. In other words, the
intersection of Rules 1 and 2 yields the following non-empty set:
{190.1.1.0− 190.1.1.255, 0− 65535, 0.0.0.0− 255.255.255.255, 90}.
On the other hand, Rule 3 is completely separate from the other two rules
and does not intersect with them. The existence of rule intersections in a fire-
wall policy can limit the size of the set of valid rule orderings and be the cause
of anomalies in the policy.
2.2.2. Precedence Relationships
As described in Section 2.1.2, a firewall policy is defined as an ordered set
of firewall rules, R, and each packet, p, will be sequentially compared to a rule,
r, in a list-like manner. Furthermore, a packet can match multiple rules, and
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this is evident by the different types of matching policies that a firewall has.
This means that the order in which the rules are maintained and processed is
important, and should be preserved. If the order is not preserved when the
rules are re-ordered (for example, if they are, instead, reversed), a packet might
match the wrong rule and violate the integrity of the policy.
The integrity of a policy is defined as the original intent of the policy. To
formalize this, let R be the original firewall security policy, and let R′ be a re-
ordering of all the rules in R. In that case, in order for the system to maintain
the integrity of the firewall policy R in R′, a packet, p, must match the same rule
and have the same action executed in R′ as it would have done in R.
It is important for the reader to understand that a firewall is not merely
comprised of disjoint rules. More often than not, there will be Precedence Re-
lationships between many of the rules. A precedence relationship is a connec-
tion between two or more rules where a rule must appear before another in
order for the integrity of the policy to be kept intact.
In order to accurately model a firewall policy with relationships, one uses a
Directed Acyclic Graph, DAG G = (R,E), rather than a list. In such a model, R
represents the set of firewall rules in a policy and E , the set of directed edges,
represents the set of precedence relationships between the rules. Representing
a firewall policy using a DAG has distinct advantages over a list representation.
They are:
• The foremost advantage of a DAG representation is that it renders the
task of modeling precedence relationships in a firewall much easier. This
is because each node in the graph will represent a rule and each directed
edge between two nodes will represent a precedence relationship. In-
deed, an edge between rules is determined by finding the intersection
between the rules in the firewall, R.
• Secondly, the problem of optimizing the rule order of a firewall has been
shown to be comparable to that of the single machine job scheduling problem
subject to certain precedence constraints. Further, since a DAG model can
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be used to represent the scheduling problem, it would be appropriate to
use a similar model in order to a model a firewall policy.
For clarification purposes, the precedence relationships specified in Table 4
are shown in Figure 1. As one can see, the figure displays the DAG, created (or
rather, implied) by the relationships. In the interest of completeness, we now
explain, in greater detail, two of the best-reported solutions for this problem.
Figure 1: A Direct Acyclic Graph (DAG) representation of a firewall security policy.
2.3. Firewall Matching Optimization: Legacy Approaches
In this section, we describe the relevant rule order optimization algorithms
that are based on matching optimization, and outline the general problem of
firewall Rule Re-ordering (RR).
The task of optimizing a firewall is comparable to that of solving the Travel-
ing Salesman Problem (TSP) [16] with precedence constraints [8]. The standard
TSP is defined as the task of finding the shortest route while traversing each
city exactly once, given N cities and their intermediate distances. However, as
observed by the author of [17], when constraints are included in the problem, it
becomes more complex. The authors of [8] examined a variant of the TSP with
14
precedence constraints. This variant, known as the Time-Dependent Traveling
Salesman Problem (TDTSP), considers the case when transition costs between
two cities depends on the time of the visit5. This implies that certain cities can
only be visited at a given time, and thus, trying to find an optimal path with
such a constraint means that some cities must be visited before others due to
the dependency relationships between the cites. This is precisely, a mapping
of the problem of finding the optimal rule ordering in a firewall policy with
dependency relationships, because finding the optimal rule ordering in a fire-
wall entails creating a rule ordering such that some rules must be “visited” or
compared against before other rules, until a match is found.
2.3.1. A Bubble Sort-like Algorithm
Since the problem is NP-hard, the author of [1], designed a simple heuristic
algorithm, given in Algorithm 1, for optimizing firewalls rule ordering.
Algorithm 1: A simple Bubble Sort-like rule ordering algorithm.
Data: A list of firewall rules
Result: A new and improved ordering of firewall rules
1 done = False
2 while !done do
3 done = True
4 for (i = 1; i < n; i++) do
5 if (pi < pi+1 AND ri∩ ri+1 = /0) then
6 interchange rules and probabilities
7 done = False
By studying the algorithm, one observes that it is similar to the Bubble Sort
algorithm. It compares neighbours and, if possible, swaps them. Further [1],
in order to preserve the rule precedence relationships, the algorithm uses rule
probabilities and rule intersection as the swapping criteria. For example, con-
5The authors of [8] confirm that the TDTSP can be mapped onto single machine job scheduling
problem [8] which is known to be NP-hard [18]. Thus the optimization problem for firewall rules
is also NP-hard. The only option to find the optimal solution requires an exhaustive search of the
solution space—which is not a scalable solution. Rather, onemust be content to find a sub-optimal
solution using a heuristic algorithm.
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sider the scenario when there are two rules, i.e., Rule1 and Rule2 where Rule1
has a lower probability than Rule 2, and where the rules don’t intersect. This
means that the rules are not dependant on each other and are thus “swap-
pable”. The algorithm will process the rules, in a pair-wise manner, until there
are no more “swappable” rules.
The problem with this algorithm, however, is that one rule can prevent an-
other from being re-ordered [1], rendering the algorithm to be unable to re-
order groups of rules. The following is an example of this problem; suppose
there are three rules, namely Rule1, Rule2, and Rule3. Rule 1 and Rule 3 have a
dependency relationship, and the rules have the associated probabilities given
in Table 6:
Rule Prob.
Rule1 0.1
Rule2 0.5
Rule3 0.4
Table 6: An example with a small number of rules with their probabilities.
Ideally, the rule with the highest matching probability would appear at the
beginning of the list of rules in order to reduce the number of packet matches.
Thus, in order to preserve the dependency relationships, the optimal rule order
is: Rule1, Rule3, Rule2. However, the algorithm by [1] is not able to achieve
this rule ordering, as explained below.
The algorithm will first swap Rule1 with Rule2. It will then check if Rule1
can be swappedwith Rule3, but because they intersect, theywill not be swaped.
In the second iteration of the While loop the problem encountered becomes
evident. Indeed, because Rule2 is better than Rule1 they will not be swapped,
and further, because Rule1 and Rule3 intersect they will not be swapped either.
Thus, when the algorithm terminates, the final order will be, clearly, subopti-
mal6.
6This is a very simplistic example. Indeed, the possibility of terminating on suboptimal solu-
tions is accentuated when the number of rules is larger.
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However, despite its problems, this algorithm will still create a rule order-
ing that is better than the original, if possible.
In the same vein (and inspired by the classical ascending-order sorting al-
gorithms), Groutl et al. proposed a method [19] to optimize the performance
of the firewall using rule re-ordering, and more particularly, swapping opera-
tions. The method aspires to push the most accessed rules to the front of the
firewall. However, the method suffers from a fundamental impediment when
the rules are dependent. Unfortunately, the swapping algorithm proposed in
[19] does not accommodate for the precedence relationships that might occur
between the filtering rules which renders the problem to be NP-hard. In this
paper, we, on the other hand, propose a simple condition that can be perceived
as a Swapping Window mechanism, and that ensures that no precedence con-
straint is violated.
2.3.2. A DAG-based Algorithm
The authors of [14] presented a heuristic algorithm for optimized policy RR
that is able to re-order a policy containing precedence relationships (or a sub-
graph in the DAG) in such a way that the policy integrity is maintained. A
short synopsis of the most important aspects of this algorithm is given below.
The algorithm functions by operating on certain data structures. It needs
a set, G(ri), of rules containing the sub-graph rules of ri, i.e. the dependency
relationships for ri. It also uses a FIFO Queue, S, to represent the optimal pol-
icy rule sorting, where S is initially empty. Additionally, it requires a list, Q,
containing the rules to be sorted, and this list is initially equal to the original
firewall policy, R.
For each pass, the algorithm selects the rule with the highest average sub-
graph probability from the graph of rules available during that particular pass.
The selected rule is then inserted into the list of sorted rules, S, if it has no
rules dependent on it. Otherwise, the algorithm iteratively sorts the subgraph
of its dependents until it finds a rule that has no dependent rules and inserts
that rule into the list of sorted rules. The algorithm then updates the respective
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data structures and repeats the process until all the rules have been placed in
S.
3. Proposed Solution
3.1. Overview of the Solution
The goal of this paper, as expressed in the problem statement, is not merely
to create a rule ordering algorithm. Rather, our aim is to explore the problem
of optimizing a firewall’s performance in a dynamic network. This means that
for the firewall to have an optimised performance at all times, there needs to
be an explicit understanding of when the rules have to be re-ordered as the
network traffic dynamically begins to favour other rules in the policy.
This implies the need for two algorithms: The first algorithmmust be useful
to achieve the necessary RR, and the second one must be capable of updating
the rule probabilities as the network traffic fluctuates. From an overall perspec-
tive, we also need a single scheme that connects both these algorithms into a
single, optimized adaptive firewall. We first consider the requirements for both
these algorithms.
• The RR algorithm should to be able to sort a firewall’s rule order based
on each rule’s matching probability, dependency relationships, and fire-
wall position. This will ensure that the average packet matching time is
reduced. In order to satisfy these criteria, the algorithm will need to have
access to the current firewall security policy, a knowledge of the depen-
dency relationships, and the matching probabilities of every rule. The
details of this algorithm are presented in Section 3.2.
• The traffic aware algorithm should be able to update a rule’s match-
ing probability dynamically as the network’s traffic state changes. This
means that this algorithmwill need to have access to the currently-applied
firewall security policy and the current number of packet matches for
each rule. In order to enable dynamic estimation of the rule matching
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probabilities, we present a novel weak estimator, which is a central com-
ponent of our approach, in Section 4.1.
• Finally, the above two algorithms must be combined in such a way that
they can communicate with each other. The traffic aware algorithm needs
to be able to update the probability associated with a rule, and this up-
date must be reflected in the rules used by the RR algorithm. If this is not
achieved, the RR will never be able to find the optimal rule ordering of
the firewall when the traffic state of the network changes. Thus, we will,
briefly, describe two mechanisms for triggering the RR, namely, periodi-
cally and “performance triggered”. These are described briefly in Section
4.2, and in more detail in the section that reports the experimental results
that we have obtained, Section 5.
The primary reason why the problem is complex is because the RR and
traffic-aware criteria themselves may be conflicting. Indeed, rule ri may have
to precede r j with regard to the network’s security policy requirements, and yet
the probability of r j being applied may be greater than that of ri being applied.
However, we will consider the RR issue first.
3.2. The Rule Re-Ordering Algorithm
The algorithm that we propose for RR, uses as its foundation the simple
RR algorithm described earlier and presented in [1], namely Algorithm 1. Our
new strategy is shown in Algorithm 2. However, before we formally present
the algorithm, we shall explain its rationale.
3.2.1. Rationale for the Algorithm
Quite naturally, the algorithm itself takes as its input, a list of rules. It also
has a list of rules that each given rule must precede, and which each rule must
succeed. If these lists collectively formed a DAG that represented a single string
of connected edges with a single source and a single sink, the problem of re-
ordering the rules would have been trivial. The problem is necessarily complex
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because the set of lists of preceding and succeeding nodes could be potentially
conflicting. Our solution represents a heuristic scheme by which these conflict-
ing requirements are resolved in the best possible manner.
To be more specific, the algorithm itself takes as its input, a list of rules. It
also maintains two data structures.
• The preceding list of a rule, ri, contains all the rules that are dependent
on ri. Essentially, this means that ri must appear before the rules in the
preceding list in order to maintain the integrity of the policy.
• The succeeding list of a rule, ri, contains all the rules that ri is dependent
on. Analogous to the above, this means that ri must appear after the rules
in the succeeding list in order to maintain the policy’s integrity.
Our algorithm contains two main loops that it iterates through. For every
iteration of the outer loop, the inner loop will traverse the whole list. The
reason for this is that the algorithm will compare the current element in the
outer loop, rx, with the current element in the inner loop, ry.
The algorithm will then try to find a swapping window between rx and ry.
A swapping window is defined as an interval of positions in a firewall in which
the two comparing rules can be swapped, without breaking the integrity of the
firewall policy. The window is found by analyzing the two comparing rule’s
succeeding and preceding lists.
By finding the rule with the highest position in the firewall in the preceding
list for rx and the rule with the lowest position in the firewall in the succeed-
ing list of ry, an interval of positions can be found. Once such an interval has
been determined, the algorithm will check if the window is a valid swapping
window for the current rules being compared.
In order to check the validity of the swapping window, the algorithm will
check if the current position of rx is less than the lowest position in the succeed-
ing list of ry and if the position of ry is grater than the highest position in the
preceding list of rx. If the latter expression is evaluated to be True, the swapping
window is deemed to be valid.
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However, the above is only valid if rx has a higher position in the firewall
than ry. In the case where ry has a higher position in the firewall than rx (as seen
in lines 12 and 13 in Algorithm 2) there is a slight difference in the swapping
criteria. In this case, the rx and ry values in the “If expression” switch places.
The swapping mechanism is illustrated in Figure 2.
Once the algorithm has found a valid swapping window and thus knows
that rx and ry can be swapped without violating the integrity of the policy, it
will do a simple comparison of the rules’ matching probabilities in order to de-
cide whether they should be swapped or not. Even if the algorithm determines
that they should be swapped, the algorithm will not properly swap them yet.
Rather, the algorithm will do this based on a criterion value, ∆new, explained
below.
The value ∆new is created using the matching probability and position num-
ber of the rules being compared against and simply yields the estimated av-
erage matching time before and after swapping rx and ry. This can be said to
represent the swapping rank of ry. The higher the swapping rank, the more
optimal the swap is considered to be. Consequently, the algorithm will then
perform a test to check whether this ∆new value is greater than the current max-
imum value of ∆, i.e., ∆max. If it is greater, then ∆max is re-set to assume this
rule’s ∆new value, and this rule is now the optimal swapping option.
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Figure 2: How Algorithm 2 re-orders rules.
When the inner loop has finished its traversal, a check is performed in order
to find if rx should be swapped with a rule or not. If it should be swapped, the
rule with highest delta value, ∆max, is chosen to be the optimal rule for it to be
swapped with. Finally, the outer loop will complete the iteration and move on
to the next rule at which point the process above is repeated for that rule.
In essence, what this heuristic algorithm tries to achieve, is to get as many
rules as possible, with a high matching probability, as close to the top of the
firewall as possible.
The formal algorithm follows.
4. Theoretical Results: Estimation and Rule Ordering
4.1. Designing a Weak Estimator for Batch Updates
Having described our RR algorithm, we now proceed to the issue of traf-
fic estimation, and design a Weak Estimator scheme that is relevant for batch
updates. The algorithm that we propose is a modified version of the weak esti-
mator algorithm initially proposed by Oommen et al [20]. It is modified in such
a way that it is able to use a batch of packet matches (as opposed to a single
packet match as the SLWE scheme from [20] would do) in order to calculate
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Algorithm 2: Our newly-proposed Rule Re-ordering algorithm.
Data: A list of firewall rules
Result: A new and improved ordering of firewall rules
1 for rx in rules do
2 ∆max = 0
3 for ry in rules do
4 ∆new = 0
5 if rx 6= ry then
6 if rx.pos < ry.pos then
7 if rx.pos < succeeding max(ry) AND
ry.pos > preceding min(rx) then
8 if rx.prob < ry.prob then
9 ∆new = (ry.prob− rx.prob)∗ (ry.pos− rx.pos)
10 if ∆max < ∆new then
11 ∆max = ∆new
12 else
13 if ry.pos < succeeding max(rx) AND
rx.pos > preceding min(ry) then
14 if ry.prob < rx.prob then
15 ∆new = (rx.prob− ry.prob)∗ (rx.pos− ry.pos)
16 if ∆max < ∆new then
17 ∆max = ∆new
18 if ∆max > 0 then
19 swap(rx, ry)
the packet matching probabilities for a given rule. This ensures that the algo-
rithm does not have to constantly perform estimate updates for each incoming
packet.
The algorithm takes as its input a list of rules and a value for its parameter,
λ . It then iterates through the list of rules and updates the probability associ-
ated with each rule by using the modified weak estimator algorithm given be-
low. Quite simply put, in order to update the probability associated with each
rule, the algorithm calculates it using the previous probability of the given rule,
pˆi, the total number of packet matches, M, and the number of packet matches
for any single rule, mi. The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3: The Weak Estimator algorithm.
Data: A list of firewall rules, and a lambda value
Result: Updated probabilities for each rule in the list of rules
1 for rule i in rules do
2 pˆi =
mi
M
pˆi +λ (pˆi−
mi
M
)
4.1.1. Theoretical Results: The Batch-oriented Weak Estimator
In this section, we present some theoretical results related to our algorithms.
The first result concerned the optimality of the devised Batch-oriented Weak
Estimator (Algorithm 3) described above. The algorithm is a generalisation
of the Stochastic Learning Weak Estimator (SLWE) proposed by Oommen and
Rueda [20]. The main difference is that the Stochastic Learning Weak Esti-
mator operates in an incremental manner, i.e., updates the estimates of the
probabilities upon receiving every single observation. As opposed to this, the
Batch-oriented Weak Estimator proposed here is able to handle a batch of M
observations.
Specifically, let X be a multinomially distributed random variable, which
takes on the values from the set {‘1’, . . . , ‘r’}. We assume that X is governed by
the distribution S = [s1, . . . ,sr]T as follows:
X = ‘i’ with the probability si, where
r∑
i=1
si = 1.
We assume that between two discrete time instants n and n+ 1, we obtain
a batch of M concrete realisations of X . Let {x(n,1),x(n,2),x(n,3), ...,x(n,M)}
denote the batch of M observations obtained between the time instants n and
n+1. The intention of the exercise is to estimate S, i.e., si for i = 1, . . . ,r based on
the batch of observations. We achieve this by maintaining a running estimate
P(n) = [p1(n), . . . , pr(n)]T of S, where pi(n) is the estimate of si at time ‘n’, for i =
1, . . . ,r. We omit the reference to time ‘n’ in P(n)whenever there is no confusion.
Letmi(n) be the number of elements in the batch {x(n,1),x(n,2),x(n,3), ...,x(n,M)}
for which X = ‘i’. Formally, mi(n) =
M∑
k=1
I(x(n,k) = 1) where I(.) is the indicator
function. Then, the values of pi(n),1≤ i≤ r, are updated in the following way:
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pi(n+ 1) ←
mi(n)
M
pi(n)+λ (pi(n)−
mi(n)
M
). (1)
The reader should note that the above algorithm is a generalization of Oom-
men and Rueda’s original SLWE algorithm [20]. In fact, when M = 1, the above
updated equation coincides with the original algorithm devised in [20].
The properties of the estimator are catalogued and proven below.
Theorem 1. Let the parameter S of the multinomial distribution be estimated by P(n)
at time ‘n’ as per equation (1). Then, E [P(∞)] = S.
Proof. The expected value of pi(n+ 1) given the estimated probabilities at time
‘n’, P, is:
E [pi(n+ 1)|P] = [
k
M
+λ (pi(n)−
k
M
)]
M∑
k=0
Prob(mi(n) = k) (2)
= [
k
M
(1−λ )+λ pi(n)]
M∑
k=0
Prob(mi(n) = k) (3)
= (1−λ )pi+(1−λ )
M∑
k=0
k
M
(
M
k
)
ski (1− si)M−k (4)
= (1−λ )pi+(1−λ )
M∑
k=0
k
M
M!
k!(M− k)!s
k
i (1− si)M−k (5)
= (1−λ )pi+(1−λ )
M∑
k=1
(M− 1)!
(k− 1)!(M− k)!s
k
i (1− si)M−k (6)
= (1−λ )pi+(1−λ )si
M∑
k=1
(
M− 1
k− 1
)
sk−1i (1− si)
M−k (7)
= (1−λ )pi+(1−λ )si
M∑
l=0
(
M
l
)
sli(1− si)M−l (8)
= (1−λ )pi+(1−λ )si. (9)
With regard to the algebraic manipulations, in Eq. (4) we have applied the
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mulinomial distribution theorem in order to obtain Prob(mi(n) = k). Further, in
Eq. (8), we have invoked a change of the variable k, where k− 1 = l. Finally, in
Eq. (9), we have applied the binomial theorem.
Taking expectations a second time, we have:
E[pi(n+ 1)] = (1−λ )si +(1−λ )E[pi(n)] . (10)
As n→∞, both equations E [pi(n+ 1)] and E [pi(n)] converge to E [pi(∞)], and
can be written:
E[pi(∞)](1−λ ) = (1−λ )si (11)
⇒ E[pi(∞)] = si . (12)
The result follows because (12) is valid for every component pi of P.
The next result deals with the rate of convergence of the mean of the esti-
mator.
Theorem 2. The rate of convergence of P is fully determined by λ .
Proof. The proof follows directly from the corresponding proof in [20]. It is
omitted to avoid repetition.
4.2. Theoretical Results: Triggering Rule Re-ordering
For triggering the decision to attempt RR in a dynamic environment, we
will use two types of approaches: Schedule-based rule ordering and Performance-
triggered rule ordering. In simple terms, the Schedule-based RR will re-order
the rule after a fixed number of packets have been received. On the other
hand, the Performance-triggered RR will re-order the rules whenever the per-
formance of the current policy degrades. Obviously, the problemwith Schedule-
based approaches is that of determining the periodicity of change. While chang-
ing the rule ordering too frequently results in unnecessary computation, if it
is changed with too low a frequency, it results in a system that is unable to
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track the environments. As opposed to this, Performance-triggered ordering
can avoid both these trends if a degradation can be detected. However the
efficiency of such a scheme is dependent on how fast the degradation can be
detected, which is actually quite related to resolving the change detection prob-
lem.
These two forms of mechanisms for triggering the RR, i.e., either periodi-
cally or Performance-triggered, are described in detail in the experimental re-
sults, Section 5.
With regard to Algorithm 2 we now prove a central result related to the
condition that we use for swapping two rules, namely ∆new. We will show that
∆new is simply the difference between the average matching time before and
after swapping. Indeed, we will prove two important properties of the RR
algorithm which are the following:
• Whenever a swapping is performed, the average matching time of the
firewall is decreased;
• The swapping condition based on the concept of the swapping window
will preserve the integrity of the firewall.
In what follows, we shall use the notation that for any rule ri, located at
position ri.pos, the associated probability of it being invoked is ry.prob.
4.2.1. The Swapping Condition
Theorem 3. The difference of the average matching time before and after swapping
two rules rx and ry is given by: ∆new = (ry.prob− rx.prob).(ry.pos− rx.pos)
Let rk.pos be the position of rule k before swapping rx and ry, and let rk.pos′
be the position of rule k after swapping rx and ry. It is easy to note that:
• rk.pos = rk.pos′ if k 6= x and k 6= y, and that
• rx.pos′ = ry.pos
• ry.pos′ = rx.pos.
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∆new = The Average time before Swapping−The Average time after Swapping
=
N∑
k=1
rk.prob · rk.pos−
N∑
k=1
rk.prob′ · rk.pos
= (rx.pos rx.prob+ ry.pos · ry.prob)− (rx.pos′ · rx.prob+ ry.pos′ · ry.prob)
= (rx.pos rx.prob+ ry.pos · ry.prob)− (ry.pos · rx.prob+ rx.pos · ry.prob)
= rx.pos(rx.prob− ry.prob)+ ry.pos(ry.prob− rx.prob)
= (ry.prob− rx.prob) · (ry.pos− rx.pos).
Note that ∆new = (ry.prob− rx.prob) · (ry.pos− rx.pos) = (rx.prob− ry.prob) ·
(rx.pos− ry.pos).
The theorem is thus proven.
4.2.2. Preserving Policy Integrity: Consistent Rule Re-ordering
Theorem 4. A rule rk does not introduce inconsistency (i.e., it obeys all precedences
relationships) if:
preceding min(rk)< rk.pos < suceeding max(rk).
Proof. The reader will observe that obeying all the precedence relationships in
which rule rk is involved in, reduces to two conditions:
• rk.pos is less than any element in succeeding list of rk
• rk.pos is bigger than any element in preceding list of rk.
The above two conditions can be written as: preceding min(rk) < rk.pos <
suceeding max(rk), proving the result.
Theorem 5. If ry.pos< succeeding max(rx)AND rx.pos> preceding min(ry), then
swapping rx and ry will not introduce inconsistency.
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Proof. It is easy to prove that a rule rk does not introduce inconsistency if
preceding min(rk)< rk.pos< suceeding max(rk), implying that all the precedences
relationships are not violated.
Let rk.pos be the position of rule k before swapping rx and ry, and let rk.pos′
be the position of rule k after swapping rx and ry. Further, observe:
• rk.pos = rk.pos′ if k 6= x and k 6= y, and that
• rx.pos′ = ry.pos
• ry.pos′ = rx.pos.
An inconsistency occurs only due to either a violation due to the new posi-
tion of rx or due to the new position of ry. We will prove that the new position
of rx, i.e., rx.pos′, does not yield inconsistency. In other words:
preceding min(rx)< rx.pos′ < suceeding max(rx).
By our hypothesis, we have ensured that ry.pos < succeeding max(rx) which
is the same as rx.pos′ < succeeding max(rx). Since we have invoked the max
operator, rx.pos′, the new position is less than any element in succeeding list of
rx. Thus, rx.pos′ < suceeding max(rk).
We shall now prove that preceding min(rx)< rx.pos′. We know that:
• rx.pos < ry.pos is equivalent to ry.pos′ < rx.pos′ since rx.pos′ = ry.pos and
ry.pos′ = rx.pos;
• preceding min(rx)< rx.pos implies that preceding min(rx)< ry.pos′.
By combining the above two observations we obtain: preceding min(rx) <
ry.pos′ < rx.pos′. We have thus proved that preceding min(rx)< rx.pos′.
Similarly, we can prove that the new position of ry will not introduce incon-
sistency if ry.pos′ is less than any element in succeeding list of rx. Hence the
result.
Theorem 6. Suppose that: rx.pos< succeeding max(ry)AND ry.pos> preceding min(rx)
then swapping rx and ry will not introduce inconsistency.
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5. Experimental Results
In this section we will describe the experimental results obtained by testing
our algorithm on a rigorous suite of environments. The experiments were di-
vided into two categories, those involving Static and Dynamic environments
respectively. While the static experiments were designed in such a manner
that they were capable of only verifying the RR algorithm, the dynamic exper-
iments verified the overall firewall optimizer. All together, we conducted six
experiments, namely three static and three dynamic experiments.
5.1. Performance Metric: The Average Matching Time
The authors of [21] defined a metric describing the average matching time
of an Access Control List (ACL). This metric can be applied to a firewall pre-
cisely because a firewall policy is comprised of ACL rules with dependency
relationships. The following describes how the metric is calculated.
Let θi represent the matching probability of a rule ri in R. Then the average
matching time of the rule is:
ri ∗θi
In other words to find the average matching time, we have to simply multiply
the rule ri’s probability with its current position in the firewall. Extending the
above to the firewall, R, the average matching time of the firewall R can be
denoted as,
N∑
i=1
ri ∗θi, for N > 1.
Thus, the average matching time is defined as the average number of rules that
a packet must be compared against before a match is found. For example, if
a policy R has an average matching time of 2.6, it means that on average, 2.6
packets will be compared against the rules, {ri}, in R before a match is found.
From this, it is apparent that to optimize a firewall, the average matching time
of the firewall must be low. By a simple analysis one sees that this can be
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achieved by ensuring that the rules with high probabilities are at the top of the
firewall.
5.2. Experimental Environment
The experiments were conducted on virtual machine instances created on
theAlto Cloud cloud service at theOslo and Akershus University College of Applied
Sciences. All the instances were obtained using an ubuntu 14.14 server image
provided in the cloud.
In order to test the algorithms and the resulting firewalls, we needed two
machines. Machine1 (M1) would run the firewall and the optimization algo-
rithms. Machine2 (M2) would generate network traffic using a traffic gener-
ating script. However, because the firewalls being tested contained rules with
random source and destination IP addresses, the traffic generating script could
not send the traffic through the internet because it would have been lost and
never reached the firewall at M1. This was because there were no hosts in
the environment that possessed those IP addresses. Consequently, in order to
solve the problem, we needed a direct connection between M1 and M2. This
connection was created by changing M2’s default gateway to the IP of M1 so
that all traffic from M2 was routed through M1. This ensured that the spoofed
IPs in the network traffic generated by the traffic generating script running on
M2, would reach the firewall at M1. Figure 3 illustrates this.
5.3. Static Experiment 1: Intra-rule Re-ordering
The intention of this experiment was to provide proof that the algorithm
for optimizing the RR was able to re-order the rules in such a way that the
rules with the highest probability were at the top of the firewall while still
maintaining the integrity of the policy. This experiment specifically tested RR
within an intra-dependant group of firewall rules.
The experiment used a small policy of eight rules as described in Table 7.
The rules {A - D} and {E - H} are intra-dependent but not inter-dependent.
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Figure 3: Proposed firewall testing environment.
This means that there are only dependency relationships between the respec-
tive rule groups {A - D} and {E - H}, but no relationships between the groups
themselves. Figure 4 illustrates the relationships in Table 7 using a DAG.
Source Destination
No. Unique Name Proto. IP PORT IP PORT Action Prob.
1 A UDP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.1147
2 B UDP 190.1.1.* * * 90-94 deny 0.0812
3 C UDP 190.1.2.* * * * deny 0.4286
4 D UDP 190.1.1.2 * * 94 accept 0.1866
5 E TCP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.0621
6 F TCP 190.1.1.* * * 88 deny 0.0499
7 G TCP 190.1.1.2 * * 88-94 deny 0.0415
8 H TCP 190.1.2.* * * * accept 0.0353
Table 7: The small firewall policy used for experiments in “Static Experiment 1”.
From Table 7 one observes that this is no optimal rule ordering. Rules C
and D have a higher probability than the rules A and B, and thus, C and D
should be placed higher up in the firewall as long as the integrity ismaintained.
Furthermore this configuration yields the firewall an average matching time of
3.4921 units.
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Figure 4: The DAG of the small firewall policy used for experiments in “Static Experiment 1”. Here
DR represents the Default Rule.
5.3.1. Expected results: Static Experiment 1
The expected results from this experiment are the following:
1. Rule C should be placed higher up than rule B, but below rule A.
2. In spite of having a higher probability than rule B, Rule D should not be
placed higher up in the firewall because of the dependency relationship
between rule B and D.
3. The average matching time will decrease when the policy is re-ordered
for optimality. It should be 2.6535.
5.3.2. Results Obtained: Static Experiment 1
As mentioned earlier, the goal of this experiment was to show that the rule
ordering algorithm was able to re-order rules while maintaining the integrity
of the firewall policy. Figure 5 shows the initial conditions of the firewall.
Consider Figure 6. From this figure, it is apparent that rule C has been
moved above rule B but below rule A. This is expected as there is no depen-
dency relationship between rule B and C, but there is one between rules A
and C which is why rule C must be placed below it in order that the integrity
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Figure 5: The FORWARD chain of iptables containing the firewall rules for Experiment 1.
of the policy is maintained. The average matching time reduced to 2.6535, as
expected.
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Figure 6: The FORWARD chain for Experiment 1 after Rule Re-ordering was achieved.
5.4. Static Experiment 2: Inter-rule Re-ordering
The intention of this experiment was to show how the rule ordering algo-
rithm was able to re-order rules with no dependency while still maintaining
the integrity of the policy. The experiment used a modified version of Table 7
where the intra-dependent rules, {E - H} had a higher probability than those
of rules {A - D}. Table 8 illustrates the new table.
As can be observed from Table 8, the rules {E - H} should appear at the
top of the policy, while rules {A - D} should be at the bottom. Because the
groups of rules are independent from each other, the policy integrity should be
maintained. The average matching time before optimization for this firewall
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configuration is 5.1427.
Source Destination
No. Unique Name Proto. IP PORT IP PORT Action Prob.
1 A UDP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.0621
2 B UDP 190.1.1.* * * 90-94 deny 0.0499
3 C UDP 190.1.2.* * * * deny 0.0415
4 D UDP 190.1.1.2 * * 94 accept 0.0353
5 E TCP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.4286
6 F TCP 190.1.1.* * * 88 deny 0.1866
7 G TCP 190.1.1.2 * * 88-94 deny 0.1147
8 H TCP 190.1.2.* * * * accept 0.0812
Table 8: The small firewall policy used for experiments in “Static Experiment 2”.
5.4.1. Expected results: Static Experiment 2
The expected results from this experiment are the following:
1. The rules {E - H} should appear at the top of the policy in the same order,
while the rules {A - D} should be at the bottom, and in the same order.
2. The averagematching time should decreasewhen the policy is re-ordered
for optimality. It should be 2.6535.
5.4.2. Results Obtained: Static Experiment 2
The results obtained confirmed that the RR algorithm was capable of re-
ordering non-dependent rules while maintaining the policy integrity of the
firewall. Figure 5 shows the initial conditions of the firewall.
The results shown in Figure 8 were essentially as expected. Rules {E - H}
were at the top, as expected, while the rules {A - D} were at the bottom. The
one difference from the expected results was that rule Cwas above rule B rather
than the expected order of A, B, C and D. However, this is still a very positive
result because our intent was to observe the re-ordering of non-dependent rules,
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Figure 7: The FORWARD chain of iptables containing the firewall rules for Experiment 2.
and thus, the intra-RR should have had no bearing on the outcome of the ex-
periment. The average matching time was 2.6619, which is slightly worse than
the expected value of 2.6535. The reason for this is that there were more packet
matches for rule C than there were for rule B, in spite of the fact that rule B was
characterized by a superior probability.
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Figure 8: The FORWARD chain for Experiment 2 after Rule Re-ordering was achieved.
5.5. Static Experiment 3: Comparing against Fulp’s Bubble Sort-like Algorithm
The next experiment was done to obtain a comparison between our RR al-
gorithm and Fulp’s Bubble Sort-like rule ordering algorithm [1] given in Sec-
tion 2.3.1 and to understand the differences in the criteria when it concerns the
resulting policy re-orderings. Here, the actual firewall IPtables scripts was not
so crucial, since wewere only interested in testing the rule ordering algorithms.
The only information that both the algorithms needed were the dependency
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relationships between the rules and the matching probabilities of the various
rules.
The experiment used a program to generate DAGs in order to generate
generic dependency relationships and probabilities. The experiment usedDAGs
consisting of a 100 nodes (rules). The optimality was measured by calculating
the average matching time of the resulting optimized firewall policies after
each algorithm had applied its rule ordering on the policy.
5.5.1. Expected results: Static Experiment 3
The algorithm presented in [1] (and given in Section 2.3.1) does not take into
account dependency relationships between multiple non-neighbouring rules,
or the position of each rule within the policy when deciding to perform a swap.
We can thus infer that it should generate policies with significantly worse av-
erage matching times than the algorithm designed by us.
5.5.2. Results Obtained: Static Experiment 3
With regard to the data generation strategy in the the program that created
the DAGs, there was a variable that decided on the probability (given in terms
of a percentage) that a pair of rules would have a dependency relationship
between them. In this experiment, we set the value of this percentage to 1% and
5%. The results of the experiments for these two values are shown in Tables 9
and 10 respectively. Also, the metric that was used to compare the algorithm
from [1] and our RR algorithm was the average matching time.
Table 9 shows the result of five tests done using a 1% chance of edges on a
graph with 100 nodes (or rules). First of all, we notice that the algorithm from
[1] is not able to noticeably improve the average matching time. As opposed to
this, our algorithm is able to significantly improve the average matching time.
By way of example, the algorithm from [1] reduced the average matching time
from 34.8254 to 31.7256 (by 8.9%). As opposed to this, our algorithm had an
average matching time of only 11.788 – a significant improvement of 66.2%.
Indeed, it was 62.8% better than the algorithm from [1].
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Percentage Initial Our Algorithm Fulp Number of Rules
1 % 26.42 12.42 24.157 100
1 % 41.18 12.16 38.81 100
1 % 31.657 12.12 24.45 100
1 % 37.31 10.87 36.2 100
1 % 37.56 11.37 35.011 100
Table 9: A comparison of our algorithm with the one presented in [1] with the DAG characterized
by a 1% chance of an edge between two nodes.
Regarding Table 10, the results obtained essentially state the same conclu-
sion. The algorithm from [1] reduced the average matching time to 41.477
(from 42.2902, i.e., by 1.9%). Our algorithm, on the other hand yielded an
average of 25.5324, which was an improvement of 39.6%. Comparatively, our
algorithm was 38.4% better than the one reported in [1].
Percentage Initial Our Algorithm Fulp Number Rules
5 % 41.98 22.87 41.33 100
5 % 30.28 21.321 29.06 100
5 % 46.371 27.701 45.52 100
5 % 33.7 21.71 33.115 100
5 % 59.12 28.06 58.36 100
Table 10: A comparison of our algorithm with the one presented in [1] with the DAG characterized
by a 5% chance of an edge between two nodes.
Overall, we can conclusively state that our algorithm was significantly bet-
ter than the one from [1]. However, understandably, we also noticed that
the complexity of finding the optimal ordering increased with the density of
the DAG. This is evident by observing that the average matching time in-
creased significantly when the probability of having a directed edge between
two nodes was increased (i.e., the graph was denser).
5.6. Dynamic Experiment 1: Schedule-based Rule Re-ordering with Dynamic Traffic
The intention of this experiment was to test both the RR algorithm and
the Batch-oriented Weak Estimator algorithm in a dynamic network using a
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Schedule-based re-orderingpolicy. The schedule policywas based on the quan-
tity of packet matches in the firewall.
The experiment used two Zipf distributions based on the firewall in Table 7.
The first distribution, Zipf dist X, gave a higher probability to the rules in the
group {E - H}, while the second distribution, Zipf dist Y, gave a higher prob-
ability to the rules in the group {A - D}. The firewall optimizer script ran the
RR algorithm for every 100 packet matches generated by the traffic generating
script using the Zipf dist X distribution. After 1,000 packets had beenmatched,
the traffic generator would switch the distribution to Zipf dist Y, while the op-
timizer script would continue to attempt RR every 100 packet matches.
With regard to the metric of comparison, for every iteration of the firewall
optimizer, we calculated the average matching time of the current firewall pol-
icy configuration, using both the current Zipf distribution probabilities and the
probability values estimated by using the Batch-orientedWeak Estimator algo-
rithm. Such a process was able to produce the true average matching time and
the estimated matching time per packet matched. A base line average match-
ing time was also calculated, which was simply the the average matching time
of the firewall without any RR. Storing these values as tuples, where each was
stored with the current number of packet matches at the time of calculation,
enabled us to create a graph displaying the improvement rate of the average
matching time for the performance of the firewall optimizer script.
The X-axis of the graph represents the total number of packet matches and
the Y -axis represents the average matching time. On this graph, we plotted the
progression of the three different matching time metrics.
5.6.1. Expected results: Dynamic Experiment 1
The expected results from this experiment were the following:
1. The average matching times should be very high at the beginning, before
steadily decreasing. Once the distribution switch occurs, the matching
times should once again sharply increase before decreasing.
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2. The exception should be the base line time, which should have a very
high matching time until the traffic changes, at which point the average
matching time should decrease sharply.
3. The true averagematching time should increase and decrease at a sharper
rate than the estimated average matching time.
5.6.2. Results Obtained: Dynamic Experiment 1
As mentioned earlier, the intention of this experiment was to test both the
rule order and traffic aware algorithms using a schedule based re-ordering pol-
icy in a dynamic network. The resulting graphs for this experiment are given
in Figures 9 and 10 respectively.
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Figure 9: The results obtained from the first data set comparing our algorithm with a traditional
schedule-based re-ordering policy.
The results of the first experiment demonstrate that the algorithms behaved
as expected. We observe that both the True and Estimated average matching
times start with high values, representative of a poorly-optimized rule order-
ing. They both, thereafter, start to gradually improve their times. However,
there are some fluctuations in the results that leads to a spiking behavior. These
spikes might be because of the nature of the traffic generator, because it does
not consistently guarantee that packets with high probabilities are always cho-
sen. Rather, the generator uses a “roulette wheel” function in order to decide
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which rule is to be tested. Thus, wemight end upwith rules with relatively low
associated probability being chosen at random and being sent to the firewall,
causing the observed fluctuations.
When comparing the True and Estimated average matching times, we ob-
serve that they both match, relatively closely, with the Estimated values being
consistently slightly below the true average matching times. Besides these ob-
servations, the base line time behaves as expected: it starts with a high aver-
age packet matching time until the switch, at which point it decreases rather
sharply, and attains a matching time that is relatively close to the optimal.
The results of the second experiment are given in Figure 10.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
True Average Matching Time
Estimated Average Matching Time
Base Average Matching Time
Figure 10: The results obtained from the second data set comparing our algorithm with a tradi-
tional schedule-based re-ordering policy.
These graphs display more unexpected results as there seems to have been
more fluctuations. While the base line times are as expected, the True and
Estimated times seem to be too flat. Again this could simply be due to the
random phenomena due to the traffic generator. More importantly, we also
observe that the True and Estimated times are not relatively aligned anymore,
which might be because of the generally low updates to each rule as it matches
a packet given by the weak estimator function.
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5.7. Dynamic Experiment 2: Extended Schedule-based Re-ordering with Dynamic
Traffic
The intention of this experiment was to see the long term effects of the algo-
rithm in a dynamic network using a Schedule based re-ordering policy. Thus,
this experiment was similar, in spirit, to the previous Schedule-based experi-
ment. However, while the general setup was the same, the scale used here was
different. The experiment used a larger firewall policy, consisting of 17 rules
as defined in Table 4 (disregarding the default rule). Consequently, the Zipf
distributions were also larger in order to match the firewall policy. Further,
in this experiment, the traffic generator started to send data using an initially
optimized Zipf distribution, and after 10,000 packets, it switched to a different
less-optimised distribution.
The RR algorithm ran every 1,000 packet matches. The average matching
times were calculated in the same manner as before, and the values were also
stored in the same manner. The resulting graphs were also similar to those
recorded for the previous experiment, but with higher maximum values on
both axes.
5.7.1. Expected results: Dynamic Experiment 2
For this experiment:
1. We expected that the average matching times would first be as low as
they can be and would thereafter continue to be relatively low close to
their optimized values until the switch occurs. Thereafter, we expected
them to increase at a fast rate, until the RR caused a steady decrease again.
2. Further, we expected that the base line time would initially have a low
and generally optimized average matching time. It would then sharply
increase once the switch occurs.
3. Finally, we expected the true average matching time to increase and de-
crease at sharper rates than the estimated average matching time.
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5.7.2. Results Obtained: Dynamic Experiment 2
The results we obtained concurred with our expectations. They are given in
the graph in Figure 11. As can be seen, the base line is within the expectations.
It has a low averagematching time in the beginning and once the switch occurs
at 10,000 packet its average matching time increases sharply and becomes very
poor.
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Figure 11: The results obtained for the second experiment, comparing our algorithm with an ex-
tended schedule-based re-ordering policy.
In this regard:
• We observe that the True average matching time behaved unexpectedly
as one would have expected to see a sharp increase in the average match-
ing time once the switch occured. However, comparing the True and
Estimated times before the distribution switch, we observe that they be-
haved very similarly. The only difference between the two was that the
True matching time had a much higher average matching time than the
Estimator. This can be explained by the fact that our version of the weak
estimator only increases each rule’s estimate by a small value.
• We further noticed that the Estimated time behaved as expected. In-
deed, this was with the exception that it had a consistently lower av-
erage matching time. This, in turn, can be explained in a similar manner,
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because our version of the weak estimator increased/decreased the rule
matching probabilities by only a small amount, each time.
5.8. Dynamic Experiment 3: Performance-Triggered Rule Re-ordering using a Sliding
Window
The intention of this experiment was to observe the behavior of the algo-
rithms when using a Performance-triggered criterion. Such a Performance-
triggered criterion was based on a sliding window comprising of the most re-
cent values of the estimated average matching time of the firewall. The ex-
periment consisted of two parts both of which used the same Zipf distribution
throughout the experiment. However, the first part shuffled the Zipf distri-
bution at the traffic generator after every 500 packets sent. The second part
shuffled the distribution after every 1,000 packets sent.
The firewall optimizer script ran the RR algorithm according to a Performance-
triggered condition. The condition consisted of a list of the latest average
matching times of the firewall. With each new calculation of the averagematch-
ing time, the value was added to the list and if the list was full, the oldest el-
ement would be removed in order to make space for the latest value. This is,
essentially, a sliding window. In order to decide whether to run RR or not,
the optimizer script determined the trend of the sliding window. If the trend
demonstrated that the average matching time was increasing, the RR proce-
dure would be invoked. Otherwise, the RR procedure would not be called.
The trend was calculated by computing the average of all but the latest value
in the sliding window, and the average was compared against the latest value.
If the average was greater, RR would run; otherwise, it would not.
The results enabled us to create a graph, in which the X-axis represented
the total number of packet matches, and the Y -axis represented the average
matching time.
5.8.1. Expected results: Dynamic Experiment 3
With regard to this experiment:
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1. We expected more RRs, but with the additional benefit that the average
matching time would stay relatively low throughout the experiment.
2. We also expected that the performancewould increasewith the size of the
sliding window. In other words, we anticipated that the average match-
ing time would vary inversely with the size of the sliding window.
5.8.2. Results Obtained: Dynamic Experiment 3
The results obtained by running this experiments are given in Figures 12
and 13.
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Figure 12: The graph obtained for the experiment with a dynamic environment where the distri-
bution switched every 500 packets sent.
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Figure 13: The graph obtained for the experiment with a dynamic environment where the distri-
bution switched every 1,000 packets sent.
From observing the results we see that, in general, the average matching
time decreasedwith the window size. The reason for this is because the scheme
is providedwith more information to determine if the trend displays an overall
increase or decrease in the matching time. A small window size will, generally
speaking, yield a lot of false positives resulting in a RR that occurs too early.
For example, we notice that in Figure 12, when the window size is 10, the
average matching time is consistently higher than for a window size equaling
50 and 100. However, in the graph where the distribution was switched after
1,000 (rather than just 500) packets, we observe that even a window size of 10
is able get comparatively good results relative to window sizes of 50 and 100.
The reason for this is that the network traffic state will stay in a relatively stable
state for a longer time span until the switch occurs. Of course, there are some
fluctuations here, but they can be be caused by the random nature of the traffic
generator.
Overall, the results match the expected results.
5.9. Discussions
In this paper, we evaluated the field of firewall optimization from two per-
spectives, namely that of firewall RR and traffic awareness. We designed and
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implemented two algorithms, and combined these into a proof-of-concept fire-
wall optimizer that was capable of re-ordering rules based on the statistics
about the network concerning each firewall rule.
The RR algorithm was able to sort a firewall policy based on each rule’s
packet matching probability, its dependency relationships, and its current po-
sition in the firewall. In that sense, it was able to remedy the weaknesses of the
work of [1]. Our solution is a simple but a rather deep algorithm in the sense
that it considers many, different and potentially conflicting criteria for RR, by
reducing the average matching time of the firewall.
The traffic aware algorithmwas able to update a rule’smatching probability
for the various rules by reading the statistics of the IPtables. It utilized a batch-
oriented novel version of the Weak Estimator algorithm due to Oommen and
Rueda [2]. Our scheme was able to use a batch of packet matches to update
a rules matching probability as opposed to the original SLWE which requires
a one-by-one updating policy, and which had to, consequently, monitor every
packet in the system. Our experience is that the single-rule-based SLWE lacks
efficiency in this application domain.
5.9.1. The Experiments
In order to verify and confirm the hypothesis that the paper proposed, we
conducted a total of six distinct experiments. The results of these were reported
here, in all brevity. The goal and results of the experiments are as follows:
• The first two were simple proof-of-concept experiments with the goal of
demonstrating that the RR algorithm was able to re-order rules in such
a way that the new rule order was superior to the original one, and that
the policy integrity was simultaneously kept intact.
• The third experimentwas a comparative study, where the algorithm from
[1] was compared against our RR algorithm. The intention was to show
that our algorithm was able to, more efficiently, optimize a given firewall
policy. The results we submitted demonstrated that our RR algorithm
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performed significantly better than the one reported in [1] by as much as
a 68% reduction in the average matching time.
• The last three experiments were more dynamic in nature. They were de-
signed and implemented to improve the speed of our RR algorithm, the
slowness of which can be attributed to the search required by a sorting al-
gorithm which is not feasible, especially in a real-life scenario with large
firewall policies. The first two of these utilized Schedule-based RR poli-
cies which simply specified when an action, i.e., to call the rule update
function, had to be executed. The experiments set the execution policy
to be after 100 packets and a 1,000 packets respectively. The resulting
graphs showed that it could be a viable solution to the catalyze the RR
algorithm.
• The last experiment was a Performance-triggered RR experiment, which
similar to Schedule-basedRR, used simple criteria to findwhen to run the
rule update function. It calculated the optimal time instances to call the
update function. In our experiment, we used a sliding window to contain
the latest average matching times of the policy and sought to determine
the trend within the window. If the trend was an overall increase in the
matching time, it meant that the current rule ordering was sub-optimal
and that it had to be re-ordered. The results from this experiment re-
vealed that this type of RR worked very well. The graphs showed that
the average matching time was consistently kept at a low level. How-
ever, reducing the computational intensity of Performance-triggering is
still unsolved.
We conclude these discussions by mentioning that we believe that primar-
ily, large organizations and institutes will benefit the most from the algorithms
and results presented here, inasmuch as they handle large amounts of data
from their workforce. Indeed, ensuring that the firewall is optimized is espe-
cially important because of the predictions made about the Internet of Things
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[3]. The predictions are that in the foreseeable future, every person will have,
on the average, 6.58 devices connected to the internet, resulting in, possibly,
50 billion devices being connected to the Internet worldwide. Having an op-
timized firewall will ensure that the firewall does not become a bottleneck in
current and future high-speed networks. Additionally, with so many devices
connected to the internet, there will inevitably be a lot of sensitive data stored
on various networks. Thus, having an optimized firewall will be able to mit-
igate malicious attacks to the networks that use static and un-optimized fire-
wall. Finally, our results can easily be integrated into existing firewalls such as
IPtables.
5.9.2. Limitations of the Weak Estimator Algorithm
This paper also included a weak estimator when the samples appeared as
a batch rather than individually. This Batch-oriented Weak Estimator algorithm
is independent of the batch size. Further, the weak estimator algorithm has
been generalized here to use the following formula to calculate an updated
probability for a given rule as:
pˆi =
mi
M
pˆi +λ (pˆi−
mi
M
),
where mi is the number of current packet matches for a given rule, and where
M is the total amount of current packet matches for the entire firewall policy.
It is apparent that the algorithm will not be able to tell the difference between
proportionate values of mi and M. Thus,
mi = 4
M = 5 ⇔
mi = 40
M = 50
We are concerned that the ratio
40
50 invloves more packets than
4
5 , and so the
former should increase the associated probability more than the latter. The
current version of the Batch-oriented Weak Estimator is incapable of this.
Another limitation of the Batch-oriented Weak Estimator algorithm is that it
must be run often because each update of the estimates, changes the probabil-
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ity values by only a small amount. This could potentially cause unnecessary
overhead. Thus, it might be a advantageous to seek an improved estimation
scheme that does not need to be run as often.
5.9.3. Future Work
The potential avenues for future work are:
• Considering existing heuristic algorithms for the Asymmetric Traveling
Salesman Problem (TSP with precedence constraints) and their applica-
tion for firewall rule optimization. We believe that this would be a fruit-
ful avenue because a TSPwith precedence constraints is equivalent to the
problem of optimizing a firewall with rules having dependency relation-
ships.
• Investigating new types of firewall optimization. One could attempt to
create a program that is able to read the fingerprint of a network (i.e the
current state of the traffic), and to generate an optimized firewall based
on this fingerprint, and to thereafter store these firewall rules/orderings
in a database. Then, on invocation, the traffic reading program should be
able to read the current traffic pattern and apply the appropriate firewall
based on the inferred fingerprint from the database.
6. Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to investigate how we could optimize a
firewall’s rule ordering using the network’s traffic statistics.
The problem statement was addressed by developing two algorithms to
achieve the Rule Re-ordering (RR) in order to optimize the firewall’s rules in
a dynamic network. The first algorithm was a RR algorithm. It was distantly
based on the philosophy introduced in [1]. However, our algorithm used more
complex criteria for initiating RR, and we experimentally demonstrated that
it was able to reduce the average matching time by as much as 68% than the
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algorithm due to [1]. Our second main contribution was to devise a traffic-
aware algorithm. It was based on the weak estimator algorithm proposed in
[20]. However, it was modified to accommodate a batch updating of the rule
probabilities rather than having to rely on keeping track of every packet in the
system in order to update the rule probabilities.
Through various rigorous experiments, we have been able to show that the
firewall performance optimizer worked very well, and that it was able to re-
order the rules by using dynamic and time-varying information gleaned from
the network.
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